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1. S tnnmary: CA 10 has held that the National 
Env i ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C . 4321 et ~. , 
r equires HUD to file an environmental impact statement before 
\,.,.:; . -a disclosure statement filed with it by a private real 
estate developer pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full 
Disclosure Act ("the Disclosure Act"), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et ~-, 
may become effective. Both the private developer and the SG 
seek certiorari, claiming that this decision is a quantum .. 
leap in the application __ of NEPA, brings NEPA into conflict 
,.....,.............. ~-with the Disclosure Act and will cause havoc in the private 
real estate business. 
2. Facts and Decision Below. The Disclosure 
Act was passed in 1968 to prevent abuses in the sale of 
_,unimproved tracts of land, by requiring developers to make 
full public disclosure of information needed by potential buyers. 
It is modeled on the Securities Act of 1933 and parallels that 
Act in many respects. Its basic requirements are that a 
developer file a "statement of record" with HUD before 
selling any lots, and that the developer furnish a potential 
purchaser a "property report" before any contract is signed . 
Both documents contain descriptions of the subdivision and 
its state of title. 
The developer cannot begin selling lots until thirty 
days after filing its statement of record which becomes 
effective automatically on the thirtieth day unless HUD decides 
( 3. 
that it is incomplete or inaccurate and requires amendments. 
If HUD acts , the effective date is suspended until the 
developer files the additional or corrected information. One 
section of the Act provides t hat 
[t]he fact that a s tatement of record with 
respect to a subdivision has been filed or is in 
effect shall not be deemed a finding by the 
Secretary that the statement of record is true 
and accurate on its face, or be held to mean 
that the Secretary has in any way passed upon the 
merits of, or given approval to, such subdivision. 
Early in 1974 the Flint Ridge Development Company, 
almost ready to start selling off a 3000 lot subdivision adjacent 
to the Illinois River in Oklahoma, filed its statement of record 
and property report with HUD. After an amendment, the statement 
be~ame effective on May 2, 1974. After the filing but before ____ ___.._-
the effective d~te, respondents filed suit in E.D. Okla. 
~ 
(Bohanan, J.) alleging that HUD's allowing the Flint Ridge 
statement to become effective would be "major federal action 
s ignificantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 
under NEPA, and that HUD therefore had to prepare an environmental 
impact statement before allowing the statement to become 
effective. On August 2, 1974, by oral order later reduced to 
writing , the DC declared the Flint Ridge statement "suspended, 
vacated, and held for naught," and enjoined HUD from approving 
the Flint Ridge filing until HUD had prepared an impact statement. 







CA 10, that a large real estate deve lopment would have a 
significant effect on the environment. The real issue was 
whether HUD's review of t he Flint Ridge filing constituted 
"major federal action." CA 10 felt t hat it did, by analogy 
4. 
to its previous decis ion in Davis v . Morton, 469 F. 2d 593 (1972), 
in which it had held t hat an i mpact statement was required 
before the Secretary of the Int erior could approve a lease of 
land ·by an Indian tribe to a land development company. The 
crux of CA lO's reasoning is this paragraph: 
The similarity between our case and Davis 
is that both involve filing and approval of 
private action. The result of approval here 
is that the developer is free to seek funds in 
commerce for the development. In each instance 
the filing i s a preliminary step which is followed 
by substantial consquences to .. the environment; 
thus, there is action which leads to the develop-
ment which in turn affects the human environment. 
Without discussing why, the court stated that it considered 
this case analogous to those in which government funding or 
government loan guarantees had been held to be major federal 
action requiring impact statements. "In sum," said CA 10, 
"the consequences of the government's approval of the statement 
in terms of ease of obtaining funds and in terms of the ultimate 
direct consequences on the environment of the building of the 
houses" showed that NEPA applied. 
CA 10 rejected the appellants'/petitioners' argument 
that its holding would bring NEPA and the Disclosure Act into 
irreconcilable conflict. The appellants'/petitioners' concern 
5. 
was that it would be impossible to prepare an impact statement 
within the thirty days the Disclosure Act allows HUD before a 
filing becomes effective automatically. The court thought HUD 
could slinply suspend the developer's statement of record pending 
preparation of the impact statement. 
3. Contentions: Flint Ridge and the SG make 
pret ty much the same contentions, the difference being that the 
SG makes the!!! ~r~ c_Qncisely and forcefully: 
'= ~~-= ... " 
(a) First, the SG emphasizes the potential impact 
of CA lO's decision upon HUD's administration of the Disclosure 
Act . The "crushing administrative burden" is illustrated by 
the fact that, even if the impact statement requirement is 
' 
confined to future original filings, HUD will be required to 
\ 
f ile SO% more such statements annually than the most now 
filed by any agency (432 annually, by the Department of 
Transportation). If the requirement should be extended to all 
consolidations and amendments of filings as well as original 
filings, HUD would have to file ten times as many statements 
annually. Should it be extended to all filings on record, 
HUD would have to file almost twice as many impact statements 
as have been filed by the entire federal government from the 
passage of NEPA to this date (3,344 final statements to date; 
HUD has 7,000 filings on record). 
(b) Second, it would seem that CA lO's reasoning also 
would apply to securities filings under the 1933 Act, since 
t he Disclosure Act was modeled on that earlier statute. In 
( 
(_ 
fact, the DC for the District of Columbia, in an un~ppealed 
decision, already has held that NEPA applies to securities 
registrations. National Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 
389 F . Supp. 689 (1974) . 
(c) Third, CA 10 has misread both the language 
6. 
and the purpose of NEPA. NEPA requires inclusion of an impact 
statement uin every reconnnendation or report on proposals for 
••• major federal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment." Under the Disclosure Act HUD makes 
no recommendation or report on a proposal for major federal 
action; it simply assures adequate disclosure by the private 
developer. The purpose of NEPA, to make agencies consider 
environmental factors in their decision-making, does not apply 
in the case of the Disclosure Act, since HUD has no substantive 
authority over the developer and does not even pass on the 
"merits" of his project. CA 10 erred in analogizing the 
Disclosure Act to statutes involving federal funding, guarantees, 
approval , and licensing, for here HUD simply has no power 
whatsoever over the private party's actual decision to 
develop the land. 
(d). CA lO's holding brings NEPA into conflict with 
the Disclosure Act, since it is impossible to prepare an impact 
statement within the thirty days accorded HUD by the Disclosure 
Act before a filing becomes effective. Contrary to whAt CA 10 
said, supra, HUD cannot simply suspend the registration until 
( 
7. 
the impact statement is prepared, for the Disclosure . Act 
specifically limits HUD's suspension power to situations in 
which the developer has fa iled to make sufficient disclosures. 
The very purpose of t he t hirty-day provision is to assure that 
t he r equirement of regis tration does not cause developers costly 
delays. 
(In i ts own petition Flint Ridge frames this particular 
point a bit mor e dr amat i cally. It claims that CA lO's 
dec ision amounts to a holding that NEPA "repealed by implication" 
the thirty-day provision of the Disclosure Act, in the face of 
this Courtt s s tatement in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973) , that NEPA was not intended to effect such repeals of 
other legi sla tion. In addition, Flint Ridge claims that the 
delay caus ed by the preparation of impact statements will throw 
untold numbers of developers into bankruptcy.) 
Respondents answer each of these contentions. First, 
t hey note that CA lO's decision seems to require an impact 
statement only f or new original filings, so HUD's figures on 
the number of statements that could be required if filings on 
record and amendments were covered are speculation at the moment. 
Second, they note that the SEC apparently has decided to live 
with the impact statement requirement imposed by the decision 
of the DC for the District of Columbia, since that agency did 
not appeal . Third, CA 10 did not misread NEPA, since HUD- obviously 
take s action which leads to a substantial effect on the environment. 
8. 
Moreover, internal HUD regulations provide for consideration 
of environmental factors~ including f i ling of an ~pact 
statement, in the cour se of all HUD activities not specifically 
exempted by the regulat ions t hemselves, and passing upon 
statements of record f rom developer s is not an exempted activity; 
thus, it seems that HUD its e lf recognizes that NEPA applies 
in this situation. Finally, HUD's concern for the effect of 
delay upon the thirty-day provis i on of the Disclosure Act 
rings hollow when one considers statistics showing that 90% of 
the filings already are held up beyond the thirty days due 
to HUD suspension orders (for amendments to complete the filings 
or correct misleading portions) . 
4. Discussion: Obviously this is an important 
case. CA lO's decision probably would not be extended to cases 
in which Disclosure Act filings are amended or consolidated, 
as the SG fears, since concern with the environmental impact 
of a real estate development logically should arise and be dealt 
with one time only, at the beginning. Nor would one expect 
a sane court to require HUD to suspend in wholesale fashion all 
filings already on record in order to investigate the ~pact 
of subdivisions already being sold. Even with the impact 
statement restricted to the future original filings, however, 
CA lO's decision will result in a substantial burden on HUD 
and costly delays for the private developers. 
person can wonder whether Congress intended or 
A reasonable 1 
even foresaw 
9. 
this effect upon the Disclosure Act, a relatively simple 
piece of consumer protection legislation, when it passed NEPA. 
Both sides cite a lot of lower court cases in efforts 
to show that application of NEPA to the Disclosure Act is or is 
not a giant step beyond previous applications. My impression 
is that it is a significant departu~~= simply insuring full 
'WE=-' ::wuz~ ....... -- ... ,_, 
disclosure in a transaction between two private parties seems 
a far cry from becoming in some sense an active partner by 
loaning or giving money, guaranteeing a loan, approving the 
t ransaction on its merits or licensing a party to make the 
transaction. CA lO's position is, in effect, that NEPA applies 
a 
anytime t he federal government has the power to stop/privat e 
t ransaction that will affect the environment. Stated differently, 
anytime Congress sets up a regulatory scheme that gives an 
agency the power to require information in connection with a 
private transaction, and to prohibit the transaction until the 
i nformation is forthcoming, NEPA would apply on the theory 
that every failure to stop a transaction that could have 
environmental consequences would be "major federal action." 
No one has illuminated the SEC's failure to appeal 
its own adverse r uling. A wild guess is that the SEC thought 
it would be hard for someone to trace a particular securities 
offering through a company's financial maze to its ultimate 
effect upon the environment, and therefore thought the DC's 
decision would not hurt too much. The SG notes, however, that 
.• . 
10. 
the SEC has informed him it wants certiorari granted in this 
case, too. 
The failure of the HUD internal regulations spec:ifically 
to exempt Disclosure Act approvals from the regulations' 
environment-related requirements may be the result of HUD's 
oversight or its feeling that no one would ever think the 
approvals were covered at all. 
Considering all factors - the effect on HUD and on 
the private developers, the Lmplications of the decision for 
other government regulatory agencies, the possible conflict 
created between NEPA and the Disclosure Act - the cases look like 
grants. 
December 1, 1975 Jordan DC and CA 10 ops. 
in both petns. 
~-
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No. 75-545 Hills v. Scenic Rivers Assn. 
I recommend reversal (which the Docket Sheet indicates 
to be almost a foregone conclusion). 
It is necessary to begin by noting a distinction 
between two possible sources of environmental information: 
(1) the agency and (2) the developer. The suit below was 
to require the agency to file EIS's before ok'ing ILSA filings. 
Resolution of that issue will not control whether HUD can or 
must seek environmental disclosures from the developers in 
the ILSA filings. 
1. Is HUD required to prepare an EIS? 
Section 102(2)(C) sets out the prerequisites for an 
EIS's'being required: "[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government 
shall -
"(C) include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment, a detailed statement [on 
environmental impact]." 
I agree with the SG and Flint Ridge that these prerequisites 
do not exist here. 
2. 
EIS's are not required under NEPA everytime an 
environmentally significant project is undertaken by someone. 
Rather, they are required when there is a "major federal 
[action] significantly affecting the ... environment." It 
is conceded that there is a significant [effect]" here, but 
it is difficult to find a "major federal [action]." This 
is so because the statutory role of the federal government 
with respect to these subdivisions is so tangential - involving 
not a substantive decision, but only requiring full disclosure. 
The entire "action" here thus is by the developers, with HUD 
playing a completely passive role of requiring complete 
disclosure. As far as impact on the environment goes, the 
statutory situation is more or less the same as is would be 
in the absence of ILSA. 
Given this, there are only two paths by which the 
Court could be faithful to the requirement that EIS's be 
filed only where there is a "major federal [action]." 
(1) The first is to hold that HUD's approval of 
ILSA filings is not "major federal [action]." (2) The 
second would be to hold that NEPA implies a grant of authority 
to HUD to block subdivisions because they are environmentally 
unsound. This would give HUD's approval qn "active" component. 
It is to be doubted that by requiring EISsfor "major 
federal actions", Congress intended to convey substantive 
authority on agencies to convert what were not "major 
federal actions" into such actions. Therefore the first 
course must be followed, and the decision below must be 
reversed. 
2. Filings by the Developers. 
Respondents really present no contrary argument. 
3. 
Their principal argument, and that of the amici, is not so 
much that there is "major federal [action]" as that it would 
be useful to make this information available to the public, 
the developers, and the state authorities who can do something 
about possible environmental damage by the developers. This 
argument, however, puts the cart before the horse. The 
purpose of § 102(2)(C) does not seem to be informing the 
public per ~· Rather it is to require federal decisionmakers 
to take environmental factors into account in choosing their 
options. Here "choice" by the federal decisionmakers plays 
no role. When that is the case, it seems unlikely that Congress 
would have wanted to finance general-education EIS statements. 
That, however, does not mean that there is no role for NEPA 
to be used as respondents suggest. HUD and Flint Ridge agree 
that NEPA may authorize HUD to require environmental disclosures 
from the developers in their ILSA filings. That, howver, 
* was not the suit below. 
* Footnote on next page. 
4. 
Summary: (1) HUD is not required to file an 
EIS because its role in approving ILSA filings is not "major 
federal [action]." 
(2) HUD may nonetheless have authority to require 
disclosures from the developers, though that question is 
not at issue here. 
CARL 
* I could not find the complaint anywhere in the 
papers. But the DC opinion makes it appear that the only 
cause of action was on whether the agency had to complete an 
EIS. I might mention that NRDC v . SEC, 387 F. Supp. 689, 
involved the same question that-will nor-De reached here -
namely, what the SEC could or should require by way of 
environmental i nformation in a registration statement. It 
did not impose on the agency any burden of preparing EIS 
statements. 
1976 
! ' ~· 
''·•, 
Co. 
-I find, after reviewing tbe briefs in the above cases, 
that I think it beat for me to recuse myself. 
l''• ' 
Io view of tbe possible retroactive impact of an 
affirmance of CAl0 1a holding, 1 could have a conflict 
of interest. ~ 
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